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Abstract 
We establish the relation between optimal subsidy rates and spillovers from the sequential adoption of a new 
technology, we find that they evolve in the same direction over time. We show that spillovers, hence the subsidy rates, 
need not be monotonic. We show that when subsidy rates are increasing, their growth rate has to be paced by the 
growth rate of the present cost of the adoption of the new technology. We also show that increasing subsidies rates 
cannot produce the desired effect of accelerating adoption if the social cost of public funds is relatively high; hence 
first-best subsidy adoptions are not always viable.
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1.  Introduction 
A new technology goes through two principal stages; the invention stage and the innovation 
stage. The invention stage is driven by firms' decisions to undertake research and development 
(R&D) efforts, the economic literature is abound with studies that attempt to understand and 
explain those decisions. Typically, R&D effort bears fruits only when research output is 
incorporated in the production process. A new technology is incorporated in the production 
process (innovation stage) only when tangible gains from its use are expected or have been 
demonstrated elsewhere. It is possible that between the invention stage and the innovation stage 
additional efforts are needed to accelerate the diffusion of the new technology. For instance, 
when inputs are particularly scarce, e.g. water and energy, the regulator may be inclined to 
encourage the early adoption of a new input-saving technology through subsidies, where the 
regulator underwrites part of the cost that each firm incurs upon the adoption of the new 
technology. 
The diffusion of a new technology was studied by Reinganum (1981a,b), Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1985), and Quirmbach (1986) among others. Hoppe (2002) provides an extensive survey 
of the literature about the timing of adoption of a new technology; she distinguishes between: (i) 
certain vs. uncertain value and availability of a new technology, and (ii) between strategic vs. 
non-strategic adoption of a new technology. Reinganum (1981a,b) shows that although identical 
and fully informed, firms adopt a new technology sequentially. Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) 
outline the importance of the threat of preemption as a rent-equalizing factor in games of timing. 
They show that when preemption is possible, payoffs in a symmetric duopoly are equal in 
equilibrium and adoption is simultaneous; however, in an oligopoly that must not be the case. 
Hendricks (1992) studies the effect of uncertainty about the gains from a new technology and 
concludes that qualitatively the equilibrium with uncertainty and without adoption 
precommitment is the same as the equilibrium without uncertainty but with commitment to 
adopt. 
In all of the above studies and those covered by Hoppe (2002) adoption subsidies were 
not considered. The properties of subsidies that promote the adoption of a new technology, the 
relation between adoption subsidies and the spillovers from adoption, or the effect of the social 
cost of public funds on adoption subsidies remain largely unresearched. In this paper we set up a 
fairly general model of timing of a new technology adoption with adoption subsidies. We 
establish the relation between subsidy rates and spillovers from the sequential adoption game and 
we show that they evolve in the same direction over time.  While the intuition suggests that 
subsidy rates should be decreasing over time when the cost of adoption decreases over time, we 
show that this is not necessarily the case. Indeed, in our model spillovers from adoption hence 
subsidy rates are not always monotonic. We then show that when subsidy rates are increasing, 
their growth rate has to be paced by the growth rate of the present cost of the adoption. Last, we 
show that increasing subsidies cannot produce the desired effect of accelerating adoption if the 
social cost of public funds or transaction costs are relatively high. In the latter case, the regulator 
should only offer second-best subsidy rates or abstains from subsidizing the adoption if it implies 
an increase in the subsidy rate over time. This last point is particularly relevant for developing 
countries where adoption subsidies tend to be used indiscriminately to promote new and efficient 
technologies even though transaction costs are high.   2
Related to our work, Stoneman and David (1986) develop a model with adoption 
subsidies to show that subsidies may not always increase welfare and that their effect depends on 
the market structure in the supply of the new technology. However, in their model Stoneman and 
David did not allow for the subsidy to change over time and its level is exogenous to the model 
while in our model the subsidy rate is endogenously determined for each period where adoption 
occurs, and is function of the gains from adoption. Jaffe and Stavins (1994) present compelling 
arguments in favor of the use of adoption subsidies, such as the information value from the use 
of the new technology by some firms and its effects on spreading the use to other firms. Also, the 
use of adoption subsidies can be motivated by the existence of free-rider problems that reduce 
R&D efforts, the regulator's support through adoption subsidies to reduce the cost of adoption 
may be necessary to circumvent that. Conceptually, the diffusion of a new technology can be 
promoted through command and control instruments such as technology standards, those can be 
justified in the presence of negative externalities such as pollution; however, in addition to the 
possibility of choosing an unambitious or infeasible standard that approach is socially inefficient 
and tends to reduce incentives to innovate (Jaffe and Stavins, 1995). 
The outline of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we introduce the general model, in 
section 3 we discuss the properties of the adoption subsidies for an oligopoly, in section 4 we 
discuss the properties of the subsidy rate, and then conclude. 
2.  The Model 
Consider an industry where N firms produce a homogenous good using technology  { } 0,1 v∈ ; an 
old technology denoted by 0 and a new technology denoted by 1. The new technology is made 
available at period zero and has the advantage of reducing the marginal cost of production. If the 
new technology is adopted at period t then its cost is  ( ) kt, its present value cost is 
() ()
rt Lt kte
− = , with r being the discount rate. It is assumed that the cost of the new technology 




When nN ≤  firms adopt the new technology and a firm uses technology v, we denote its 
profit at every period by 
v
n π  with the stipulation that 
1
0 π  and 
0
N π  do not exist.  We assume that; 
Assumption 1. Firms realize positive profits,  0; ,
v
n vn π >∀ . 
Assumption 2. The adoption of the new technology is always more profitable than the 
non adoption and that a firm's profit decreases as more firms adopt the new technology, 
11 00
0 ; nn n nn ππππ ′ ′ >>>∀ ≥ . 
In static, we can set up a payoff matrix of the decision to adopt the new technology and 
find that the Nash equilibrium is that all firms adopt the new technology. However the 
introduction of dynamics leads to a different outcome. In the case of N firms, if a firm is the i
th to 
adopt the new technology, then it chooses the optimal period  i T  of adoption by maximizing; 
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In the duopoly case, Reinganum (1981a) shows that there are two symmetric Nash 
equilibiria and conjectures that in an oligopoly there are  ! N  pure symmetric Nash equilibria; one 
equilibrium for each possible sequence of the firms' adoption of the new technology. Reinganum 
(1981a,b) also shows that the simultaneous adoption of the new technology is not an equilibrium; 
a diffusion process takes place although the firms are identical and operating in a full 
information environment, including in the case of an oligopolistic market (Reinganum, 1981b).
2 
So in the remainder of this paper the following assumption holds. 
Assumption 3. Firms adopt the new technology sequentially. 
3.  Technology Adoption Subsidies 
When a firm adopts the new technology its marginal cost decreases, hence its output increases. 
At the aggregate level, the sequence of total outputs { } n Q  is positive increasing and the sequence 
of consumers' surpluses { } n S  is positive increasing. We define { } n w  as being the sequence of 
social welfares – the sum of consumers' surplus and firms' profits. The aforementioned 
sequences are all assumed bounded above, hence convergent. 
For the n
th firm to adopt the new technology at period  n T  we define  ( ) nn ss T ≡ , 
() nn LL T ≡ , and  ( ) nn kk T ≡ ; then with  0 λ >  the social cost of public funds (can also be thought 
of as transaction cost), the regulator maximizes the following program to determine the optimal 
subsidy rates { } n s , 
() ( )
1
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2 Reinganum (1981b) attributes the diffusion process to "purely strategic behavior" while Quirmbach (1986) 
attributes it to decreasing incremental benefits and adoption costs for late adopters. The introduction of adoption 
subsidies does not change the diffusion sequence, but has the potential of changing the adoption lags since, if 
positive, the subsidy makes the technology more affordable at an earlier date.   4
The two inequalities (4) and (5) imply that the optimal adoption time  i T  should be 
constrained according to a predefined sequence (Assumption 3). The above problem is then 
solved as follow. First, the optimal adoption time  i T  is determined from constraint (3), then 
taking into account these optimal adoption dates, the objective function is maximized with 
respect to subsidy rates  ( ) i sT .
3 
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From the above expressions of subsidy rates, we note that they are decreasing with 
respect to the social cost of public funds. Typically, countries with heavy bureaucracies and 
prevalent corruption have higher transaction costs. The subsidy rates depend directly on 
spillovers from the sequential adoption of the new technology; the spillovers refer to the gains to 
the rest of the economy when a firm adopts the new technology. We define the spillover ratio by: 
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With λ  being a positive constant, the direction of the sequence { } n s  in (9) is determined by the 
direction of the sequence { } n β , where  0 nn ds dβ > . We summarize those finding in the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1: The welfare maximizing subsidy from problem (2)-(5) is given by (9). The 
subsidy rate depends directly on the spillover ratio  n β  and the cost of public funds λ , further 
the subsidy rate  n s  and the spillover ratio  n β  evolve in the same direction. 
                                                 
3 Notice that if the subsidy rate is equal to one all the firms adopt the new technology at period zero since all the 
costs are paid for by the regulator.   5
We now show that the spillover ratio is not monotonic, for that we need to establish the 
behavior of the sequences { } 1 nn SS − − , { }
11
1 nn ππ − − , { }
00
1 nn ππ − − , and { }
10
1 nn ππ − −  in the following 
lemmas. 
Lemma 1. The sequence { } 1 nn SS − −  is positive decreasing. 
Lemma 2. The sequence { }
11
1 nn ππ − −  is negative increasing. 
Lemma 3. The sequence { }
00
1 nn ππ − −  is negative increasing. 
Proof (similarly for Lemmas 1 and 2). Consider the sequence { }
00
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n π  is bounded, the infinite series theorem 
implies that 
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0
n π  is a positive decreasing sequence then the sequence 
{ }
00
1 nn ππ − −   is  negative  increasing.         □ 
Lemma 4. The sequence { }
10
1 nn ππ − −  is positive, decreasing and convergent. 
Proof. By assumption 2, we have 
10
1 0 nn ππ − − > . The sequence { }
10
1 nn ππ − −  is therefore 
positive, decreasing and convergent because as the number of firms who adopt the new 
technology increases the gains from the adoption of the new technology shrink, this implies that  
() { }
10
1 1 nn ππ − − i s   i n c r e a s i n g .           □ 
  The following proposition summarizes the findings from lemmas 1 to 4. 
Proposition 2. The sequence of spillovers { } n β  converges to zero but is not monotonic, 
therefore the subsidy rates sequence { } n s  also converges to zero and is not monotonic. 
Proof. Let  () ( ) ( )( )
11 00
11 1 1 nn n nn nn SS n N n ππ ππ −− − Δ= − + − − + − − , then from the above 
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Lemmas 1 to 3 show that { } n Δ  is not monotonic, therefore { } n β  and { } n s  are also not 
monotonic.            □ 
4. Properties of the Subsidy Rate 
In the previous section we established that the optimal subsidy rate is not monotonic but it 
converges to zero. In this section we establish the required conditions for subsidies to be   6
effective in encouraging the adoption of a new technology. We also show that if the subsidy rate 
is increasing over time then it needs to be paced and that an increasing optimal subsidy rate is 
viable only when transaction costs and the social cost of public funds are low. 
In order for subsidies to stimulate the adoption of the new technology they need to be 
positive. For the subsidy rate in (9) to be nonnegative it is necessary that either  0 n β ≥  or that 
() 1 n β λ <− + . The only case where the subsidy rate can be negative is therefore within a limited 
range,  () 10 n λβ −+ < <. The sign of  n β  from (8) is determined by the effect that the adoption 
by one additional firm has on the rest of the economy; i.e. the balance of the gains in consumers' 
welfare and the decrease in the profits of all the other firms. If the regulator is encouraging the 
spread of the new technology and for some n we have  ( ) 10 n λβ − +<<  then the regulator may 
opt to not subsidize the n
th firm that adopts the new technology. If the regulator wants to 
discourage the adoption of the new technology and command and control instruments are not 
possible then a prohibitively high and constant adoption tax could be alternatively imposed at 
period 0. This would be more effective and easier to implement than setting up a dynamic 
adoption tax. 
For a given firm, the first-order conditions for determining the adoption dates with and 
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In order for the firms to adopt the new technology at an earlier period than without 
subsidies, it is necessary that  () ( ) 1 sk s rk k rk k +− − < −    (Figure 1). If the subsidy rate decreases 
over time,  0 s <  , then there are no perverse effects to the subsidy. But if subsidy rate increases 
over time,  0 s >  , then for the subsidy to encourage earlier adoption, the growth rate of the 
subsidy rate must be bound by the growth rate of the present cost of the adoption of the new 
technology, ss r kk <−   .   7
 
Figure 1. Effect of subsidies on the timing of adoption. 
We now show that when the subsidy rate is increasing the condition ss r kk <−    can 
only be met when the social cost of public funds does not exceed a given level, beyond which a 
first-best optimal adoption subsidy should not be offered because it discourages and hence delays 
adoption. Let  1 nn n www − Δ=−  and 
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an optimal subsidy rate should be offered to all adopters of the new technology. 
The implication of this is that if  1 nn ss − >  but the condition  n λ λ ≤  is not met, then an 
optimal subsidy rate is not viable at period  n T , but a second-best subsidy rate such that  1 n ss − ′≤  
could be offered. In fact, in that case even without a subsidy the firm would still adopt the new 
technology at period  ˆ





>  the regulator offers only non-increasing subsidy 
rates to all adopters, some of the offered subsidy rates are not optimal. We summarize the results 
of the discussion in the following proposition. 
Proposition 3:  When adoption subsidy rates are decreasing the incentive to accelerate the 
adoption of a new technology is effective.  But for increasing subsidy rates to be effective the 





> , then 
adopters of the new technology are offered non-increasing subsidy rates that are not necessarily 
first best. 
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5. Conclusion 
Using a general model of technology adoption we looked into the optimal timing of the adoption 
of a new technology by firms in the presence of adoption subsidies. Adoption subsidies are a 
commonly used instrument to promote R&D effort and the use of new technologies. We have 
established the link between optimal adoption subsidies and spillovers from the sequential 
adoption of the new technology. The intuition suggests that the subsidy rates should be 
decreasing because the adoption cost is decreasing over time; contrary to the intuition we showed 
that in general spillovers and adoption subsidy are not monotonic and that when subsidy rates are 
increasing careful attention must be given to their growth rate and to the level of the social cost 
of public funds or transaction costs; otherwise, increasing subsidy rates may produce the 
undesirable effect of slowing down the adoption of the new technology. 
In this paper it is assumed that all decisions are made under certainty, an obvious 
extension of the above model would be to include uncertainty about the gains from the new 
technology. This would affect the spillovers from adoption and adoption subsidies. Another 
possible extension would allow for the possibility of the appearance of a second new technology 
after the first new technology is made available. Such a new scenario would alter the gains from 
adoption and allow for the possibility of second mover's advantage eventually leading to a 
qualitatively different outcome as far as subsidy and spillovers are concerned. One would expect 
that delays in the adoption of the first new technology appear and possibly bring to a halt the 
adoption of that technology.   9
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